EU strategic autonomy: A fine line between geopolitics and protectionism

Increasing calls for Europe to boost its autonomy and decrease its dependence on others in strategic fields amid rising global competition have divided EU stakeholders.

The EU “strategic autonomy” concept gained prominence after the war in Ukraine and the COVID pandemic, amid the high dependence on energy and raw materials from third countries such as Russia and China, respectively.

In an event organised recently by Euractiv, Thanasis Bakolas, secretary-general of the European People’s Party (EPP) commented: “We know that Europe is at a stage where its economy is not competitive, and we are also aware of our geopolitical footprint.”

Several business stakeholders who attended the event expressed diverging views on the matter, with some stressing Europe’s need to become independent from third actors and others highlighting the risks of such an approach leading to protectionism.

A ‘dangerous’ concept

For Karel Lannoo, CEO of the independent Centre for European Policy Studies think tank (CEPS), strategic autonomy is a “dangerous” concept.

“It’s just to hide the protectionism we have embarked on and will be very costly for Europe if we go on further on that route”, he told Euractiv. “Europe has been open to trade, Europe has been home to trade. We need to be home to trade otherwise we won’t be who we are. We will be even worse with strategic autonomy.”

But Lannoo acknowledged that there are countries which blackmail Europe over its dependencies, and that this must come to an end. Citing the Russian gas as an example, he explained that Europe mapped its needs and then rapidly reoriented.

Karel Lannoo, CEO of the independent Centre for European Policy Studies think tank (CEPS) [Euractiv | Zoran Popovici]

“Like we do with gas, there are different ways you can respond to this. You just make sure you have strategic reserves, for example, gas. You could do the same for raw materials […] pharmaceutical products, in case of problems, produce at least some quantities”.

He noted, however, that this cannot apply everywhere but only in important sectors of the EU economy.

“Regarding raw materials, if you don’t get them from China, you can get them from Syria or another country. So, we need to map these dependencies, the suppliers, and see how dangerous it is,” he added.

Striking the right balance

Martin Bresson from Invest Europe, a trade association representing Europe’s private equity, venture capital and infrastructure sectors, noted that from the investors’ perspective, it’s a “balancing point’.

“Because if you get closed, then Europe dies. But if we don’t protect, Europe also dies,” he told Euractiv.

Bresson said that although some may interpret autonomy as leaning toward self-sufficiency and therefore protectionism, Europe needs to be open to foreign investors.

“We need money from outside to flow to Europe so that they can invest in our funds […] because otherwise there’s just not enough money to make all the transitions that Europe needs: the energy and digital transition, and even more so if you want to make those transitions fair, that’s not going to make them cheaper.”

However, Bresson also stressed that domestic industry, innovators, and start-ups need to be simultaneously supported and therefore protected in a global competitive environment. Otherwise, he said, they will flee to other countries such as the US, where they will be offered easy access to public financing and large markets.

He stressed the need to have a different approach to the balancing point between open globalisation and open autonomy.

“We used to say if we can get things done cheaper in Korea or China, and we import the things at a lower price … everyone wins, because China gets richer, the richer they get, the more democratic they will also become.”

“The world is more complex […] the other parties didn’t get better democracies in the meantime, and we didn’t quite elevate ourselves with the money that we were supposed to save on the cheap products and then do something that was even bigger and better.”

Defence, a sensitive aspect

Europe’s strategic autonomy in defence became more evident after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, with analysts suggesting that Europe needs to find its place in a new complex geopolitical world that has emerged.

Ionela Maria Ciolan, a foreign policy and defence expert at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, said the post-Cold War European security architecture has collapsed as Russia “seeks to redraw European borders by force”.

“Meanwhile, isolationist sentiments in the US, fuelled by the perception of inadequate European defence contributions, could further strain transatlantic relations if Donald Trump becomes the next US president,” she noted.

In such a scenario, Ciolan expects less American commitment to support Ukraine and a growing need for Europeans to bear greater responsibility and become a real security provider for the European continent and against the Russian threat.

“The Europeans should address military capability gaps within NATO and the EU. The concept of EU strategic autonomy is not a challenge to the US or NATO, but an effort to strengthen European defence capabilities together.”

“In concrete terms, EU strategic autonomy in security and defence also means strengthening the European pillar of NATO,” she said, insisting that Europe should rely on suppliers from home or from countries that share our values.

“We’ve already reduced our dependence on Russia, but we need to step up our de-risking strategy towards China […] EU policy towards China should be based on the principles of cooperation where possible, competition where necessary and confrontation when necessary,” she concluded.

[Sarantis Michalopoulos – Edited by Zoran Radosavljevic | Euractiv.com]

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