How Belarusian nationalism has become a tool in information wars

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is an important part of Lithuanian and Belarusian history, but the mutual past creates tensions between the two nations, which only benefits Russia.

The period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania remains an important part of Belarusian identity, especially among people of pro-European views.

The different perception of some parts of its history has never appeared to be a big issue for Lithuanians and Belarusians, especially compared to the more destructive conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries, such as between Russia and Ukraine, or Armenia and Azerbaijan.

However, recent years have become a period when history-related tensions between the two nations peaked. These days. Lithuanian historians and politicians are actively discussing the threats that may come from the growing Belarusian diaspora.

Their cause is often attributed to ‘Litvinism’ – an ideology and branch of Belarusian nationalism, according to which modern Belarusians, who are called Litvins by the supporters of this ideology, are proclaimed real heirs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s legacy.

Among many factors, the roots of this concept come from the multilingual nature of Dutchy and its borders that fully encompassed the modern territories of Lithuania and Belarus.

Nevertheless, there is a strong reason to assume that Litvinism is no more than a tool of a propaganda war. The actual beneficiaries of the dissemination of such ideas do not appear to be either Belarusians or Lithuanians.

Information wars on this topic in Lithuania went beyond the media scope. This year, Lithuanian politicians and public figures received many emails from groups that described themselves as Litvinism supporters who operated in Lithuania. Besides, the writings “Vilnia Nasha” (“Vilnius is Ours” in Belarusian) started to appear on Vilnius streets.

However, these cases look like information attacks made to intensify the feeling of the Belarusian threat. The analysis of the writings showed that they appear to have been made by a person not used to writing in Cyrillic, an alphabet used in the Belarusian language.

Regarding the emails, the State Security Department of Lithuania stated that while some members of the Belarusian diaspora support radical political ideologies, there are no organised groups in Lithuania that promote Litvinism.

Moreover, the department considers these emails as psychological and informational pressure, emphasising that such attacks are used by Belarusian authorities to incite hatred between Lithuanians and Belarusians.

Despite these official statements, the discussions among Lithuanian politicians and experts on Litvinism were quite active and sometimes followed by accusations of Belarusian diaspora representatives and each other in an “anti-state” position.

The situation found a response in Belarusian democratic forces. Their leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, called Litvinism an artificially created problem aimed at intimidating Lithuanians.

Litvinism – shrouded in ambivalence on both sides

Pavel Usau, a political expert and representative of a conservative wing of Belarusian democratic opposition, considers that the problem around Litvinism could have been created by Lithuanian politicians for the sake of consolidating society before the presidential elections, which took place in Lithuania in 2024.

While Rustis Kamuntavicius, a Lithuanian historian, says Lithuanians fear that Litvinism gives a basis for Belarusians to claim the nation’s capital, Vilnius, the ideology itself does not appear to have been used in political campaigns.

The response of Lithuanian authorities is related mostly to the actions of the Belarusian regime, such as the migration crisis on the Lithuanian-Belarusian border and assistance to Russia in its war against Ukraine.

It took the form of growing restrictions, more rigorous examination of arriving Belarusians, and the intention to send back people affiliated with the Belarusian authorities or state organisations.

While these measures have a negative impact on the attitude of Belarusians toward Lithuania, it is barely possible to connect them to Litvinism.

But how about the Belarusian regime?

Alexander Lukashenko, the leader of Belarus, and his supporters have never been strongly interested in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, prioritising and giving more importance to the Soviet period of Belarusian history.

Official Minsk needed the Duchy’s legacy mostly for political reasons, using it, for example, when it wanted to direct the Belarusian society closer or farther from Russia.

Thus, at the beginning of his presidential career, Lukashenko called the Grand Duchy of Lithuania a hostile state where Belarusians were oppressed by Polish and Lithuanian feudal lords.

When the relations with the European Union became warmer in the 2010s, Belarusian authorities installed monuments of the Duchy’s rulers, Great Dukes Vytautas and Algirdas, and Lukashenko referred to the Dutchy as the Belarusian state and to Lithuanians as brothers.

However, the ambivalent attitude of the Belarusian regime to Litvinism-related ideas does not mean that it cannot benefit from tense discussions around them.

Information attacks, mentioned by Lithuania’s State Security Department, have concrete purposes: Official Minsk needs to explain to the population the strengthening of ties with Russia and the positioning of other neighbours as the ones who want to push Belarusians out of their countries can contribute to it.

The long-term beneficiary of this conflict is Russia. While the experts argue whether there is direct Russian intervention – and no evidence of it has been presented to the public – any conflicts between Belarus and its other neighbours limit the manoeuvring space for official Minsk in building its foreign policy.

It becomes more acute today when Lukashenko is trying to find a counterbalance to the strong Russian influence.

In July, Belarus became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, while the newly appointed Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou chose China as the first country for his visit.

Widening the gap between Belarusians and Lithuanians by re-introducing Litvinism threats into the public sphere would help Russia avoid spending additional resources on keeping Belarus in its sphere of influence.

Litvinism has already become a part of political games.

Lithuanian intelligence services are keeping an eye on this situation, however, the ambiguous positions of some politicians and experts on the Litvinism threat, without a clear message to the Lithuanian society, will continue to create benefits for the political regimes Lithuania is fighting against.

This article is part of the FREIHEIT media project on Europe’s Neighbourhood, funded by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF).

[Edited by Alexandra Brzozowski/Zoran Radosavljevic]

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