Trump’s shadow: Can Germany chip in more for Europe’s security? 

A second Trump presidency would likely force Europe to up its security spending, but the German government, which wants to take more responsibility in the EU amid a looming global power vacuum, could be too paralysed to significantly increase its share. 

The possibility of a Trump win in November’s election has in recent weeks kicked off a debate about how much Europe’s leading economy could compensate for America’s retreat from the world stage.

Based on Trump’s first presidential term, a second term could see anything from repeated calls on the EU to spend more on defence to attempts to withdraw America from NATO entirely. American aid for Ukraine could also be at risk. 

German officials, including Chancellor Olaf Scholz, have stressed that Germany is ready to take more responsibility for the EU’s foreign and security policy in response to a Trump presidency and political chaos in France, and are briefing about their preparations.

But they have been tight-lipped when asked about one of the key challenges for Europe if Trump returns: whether it will collectively ramp up spending on security. 

Publicly, government spokespeople merely declined to “speculate about election outcomes”. A source close to Scholz’s SPD (S&D) told Euractiv that “it’s too early to discuss whether Germany will increase its security spending in case of a second Trump term.”

Developments around next year’s budget suggest that Germany’s ruling coalition is all but deadlocked regarding the issue of higher security funding, however.

Overall, the country is better prepared for a second Trump presidency in that regard, said Jacob Ross, foreign policy expert at the DGAP think tank. He pointed to the change that pacifist Germany has undergone since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, dubbed a “Zeitenwende” (turning point).

Germany now reaches NATO’s 2% spending target and is stationing troops in Lithuania. It is also the second-largest donor to Ukraine, contributing four times more than France, according to the Kiel Institute. 

Defence deadlock

And yet, “the United States will expect Europeans to invest even more in their defence,” noted Nils Schmid, the SPD’s lead MP on foreign affairs.

There is awareness among the coalition government of SPD, FDP (Renew) and Greens that this requires Berlin’s financial firepower. 

“Germany takes a central role in Europe’s security architecture [because] Italy, Spain and France are no longer as potent as they used to be, especially regarding their budgets. But Germany remains financially strong (…),” Schmid’s FDP counterpart, Ulrich Lechte, told Euractiv. 

As the government has been preparing for a second Trump term for about a year, according to Lechte, it is likely that higher spending is at least being discussed. Coalition members have also signalled their willingness to go there.

On a trip through the United States, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius pleaded on Wednesday that NATO has “to go beyond the 2% target.”

“That is a clear call – also to my own government,” he added.

However, the coalition appears deadlocked on how to push spending beyond current levels, which have all but exhausted Germany’s constitutional borrowing limit, the debt brake. 

Green officials such as Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have suggested suspending the debt brake; the FDP insists on sticking with it, backing cuts to raise money. Those are in turn unlikely to be backed by the SPD and Greens. 

Last month’s draft budget for next year indicated the maximum compromise, with no obvious cuts but defence spending topped up below inflation levels.

Hence, a significant increase in security spending in case of a Trump presidency is not likely, another source close to the FDP told Euractiv, pointing out only that the debt brake allows for exceptions in emergencies. 

Is less, more?

The effects of Germany’s stinginess are already being felt at the EU level. At June’s EU summit, the chancellor put brakes on Poland’s proposal to jointly fund an EU border fence and opposed joint EU security investment via common EU debt. 

Concrete remedies for a Trump return that are discussed publicly are cheaper and confined to providing stability and strengthening Germany’s old diplomatic leadership role in Europe — a role of the “leader of the free world” that then-Chancellor Angela Merkel assumed during Trump’s first term. 

Similarly, Schmid saw Scholz’s “experience and skill” in organising majorities within the EU as key to presenting a united European front on the global stage. Germany would also sign a large-scale security treaty with the UK and is building relations with Republican congressmen and governors, he said. 

Lechte pointed to improving coordination with Poland and the Weimar Triangle while the Greens’ foreign affairs lead MP Deborah Duering emphasised strengthening crisis prevention and multilateral organisations, which “Trump will [likely] weaken massively.” 

If this is sufficient to address a potential loss in American hard and financial power remains doubtful, however. 

Even Merkel’s depiction “as ‘leader of the free world’ in Trump times was based more on appearance than reality”, DGAP’s Ross noted, adding that Europe was still dependent on America’s military infrastructure and deterrence. 

[Edited by Oliver Noyan & Chris Powers]

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